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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY BUTLER, previously known ) 
as MARY HILL, ) RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) 
) CASE NO: 870302 
vs. ) 
HANK L. LEE AND JANET W. LEE, ) 
) PRIORITY 14B 
Defendants/Appellants. ) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent and Jack Hill were husband and wife and 
during the course of their marriage had purchased two 
adjacent parcels of property; one known as the Winegar 
property and the other one known as the Wilcox property. (R. 
26) 
In approximately 1973 the Winegar property which had a 
building located on it was leased to the Appellants to be 
used and operated by them as a restaurant. (R. 26) Shortly 
after the leasing of the restaurant and property to the 
Appellants, the Respondent and her husband built a storage 
facility on the adjacent Wilcox property which was located 
towards the rear of the Wilcox property and ran roughly 
northeast to southwest parallel to the property line between 
the Winegar property and the Wilcox property. (R. 27) 
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The storage facility located upon the Wilcox property 
is 60 feet by approximately 144 feet with twelve storage 
bays on each side of the building, with 10 foot garage doors 
allowing access so as to accommodate boats and other recre-
ational equipment. (R. 27) 
The northwest side of the storage building is approxi-
mately six feet from the property line separating the Wilcox 
and the Winegar property and a portion of the Winegar 
property, approximately 24 feet in width and the length of 
the building, is used for access to storage units on the 
northwest side of the facility. Mr. Hill, the previous 
spouse of the Respondent, had discussed the building of the 
units with Mr. Lee, one of the Appellants, prior to the 
construction of the storage units and in addition the fact 
that a portion of the Winegar property would be used as 
access to the storage units on the northwest side of the 
facility. (R. 27) 
The Appellants had leased the Winegar property before 
the storage facility was built until the Appellants pur-
chased the Winegar property in 1981, and the Appellants had 
on a number of occasions requested to buy the Winegar 
property and had discussed with Mr. Hill the necessity of 
the use of a portion of the Winegar property by the storage 
facility over the years. (R. 28) At all times the 
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Appellants were aware of the use of a portion of the Winegar 
property for access to the storage units to the west of the 
facility. 
In 1981 the Respondent and Mr, Hill were divorced and 
as part of the divorce settlement:, the Respondent was 
awarded the Wilcox property and the storage facility there-
on , and Mr. Hill was awarded the Winegar property and the 
building leased thereon. (R. 28) 
Mr. Hill represented to the Respondent that she had a 
continuing right to use the Winegar property for access to 
the northwest units of the storage facility. After the 
transfer of the Wilcox property to the Respondent by Mr. 
Hill in 1981, Mr. Hill sold the Winegar property to the 
Appellants in September of 1981 and discussed the operation 
of the storage shed as it affected the property purchased by 
the Appellants, and that that use would continue even though 
nothing was placed in the contract to the sale to that 
effect. (R. 28) 
The Respondent has continued to operate the storage 
facility since 1981 using a part of the adjacent Winegar 
property as access to the 12 west units of the storage 
facility which use the Appellants were aware of and have 
made no objection to until the fall of 1985. (R. 28, 29) 
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During the summer of 1985, the Appellants developed 
plans for the construction of a commercial building upon 
their rear parking lot and the Respondent then filed an 
action for Declaratory Judgment claiming an easement over 
the Appellants1 rear parking lot for ingress and egress to 
the storage sheds due to the Appellants proposed con-
struction preventing vehicular access to the storage units 
contained in the storage shed. 
The trial Judge specifically found that if the Respon-
dent is not allowed to use the Appellants' property for 
access to the west 12 units, then there would be no reason-
able access thereto with the exception of access that could 
be obtained to the west units by removing the partition 
separating the two 30-foot units, thus making one 60-foot 
unit, but such access would be impractical and economically 
infeasible. (R. 29) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
The trial Courtfs factual findings should be afforded 
great deference and not be overturned unless this Court 
finds that the trial Court has misapplied the law or that 
the trial Court's findings are clearly against the weight of 
the evidence. 
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POINT II. 
An easement by implication or necessity has been 
previously defined by the Utah Supreme Court and therefore 
should be followed by this Court. 
POINT III. 
An easement by implication or necessity need not be 
inferred from written documents and can be found even with 
the express absence of a written document based on necessi-
ty. 
POINT IV. 
The lower Court found that the easement was reasonably 
necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate and 
thereby met case authority for this jurisdiction. 
POINT V. 
The trial Court correctly denied the admission or 
testimony pertaining to the econo4ic loss to Defen-
dants/Appellants . 
POINT VI. 
The Respondent is entitled to an easement by implica-
tion or necessity, or at the very least, to an irrevocable 
license coupled with an interest. 
POINT VII. 
If the Appellants1 appeal is frivolous or for delay, 
then the Respondent is entitled tp damages including 
5 
reasonable attorneyfs fees, or if the judgment is affirmed, 
then the Respondent is entitled to costs against the Appel-
lants . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT!S FACTUAL FINDINGS ARE 
AFFORDED GREAT DEFERENCE AND WILL NOT BE 
OVERTURNED UNLESS THE TRIAL COURT HAS 
MISAPPLIED THE LAW OR ITS FINDINGS ARE 
CLEARLY AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE 
EVIDENCE. 
This Court in Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 (Utah 
1982) , ruled that the Appellate Court must afford great 
deference to the factual findings by a trial Court unless 
the trial Court has misapplied the law, or its findings are 
clearly against the evidence. 
The lower Court in this case had the opportunity of a 
trial wherein the Respondent and her former spouse, Mr. 
Hill, both testified under oath as to the factual issues in 
question, and further, the Appellants, Mr. and Mrs. Lee, had 
the opportunity to also testify. 
The Court after weighing the evidence, the testimony of 
the parties, reviewing Memorandums of Law submitted by the 
parties1 counsel, and having taken the matter under advise-
ment, found that the Plaintiff/Respondent had proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence that there was indeed an 
easement by implication or necessity. 
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Therefore, this reviewing or Appellate Court not only 
should, but must, afford great deference to those factual 
findings unless the Appellant can show that the trial Court 
has misapplied the law or that the trial Court's findings 
are clearly against the weight of the evidence, neither of 
which the Appellants have accomplished, therefore, the 
ruling of the lower Court should standi 
POINT II. 
APPELLANTS DEFINITION OF AN EASEMENT BY 
IMPLICATION OR NECESSITY IS INCORRECTLY 
CITED. 
Appellant refers to the Restatement of the Law of 
Property § 476 for a list of relevant factors to be con-
sidered by this Court in determining! the existence of an 
implied easement or easement by implication or necessity, 
and refers specifically to eight requirements and claims 
that only two of the factors cited in its brief lend support 
to the finding of an easement in the present case. 
The Respondent in this case submitted to the trial 
Court a Memorandum of Law on October 27, 198 6, at the 
request of the trial Court Judge, dated October 14, 1986. 
(R. 17-25) In this Memorandum, Respondent cites the trial 
Court to the decisions of the Utah Supreme Court in examin-
ing and ruling on the requirements necessary for an easement 
by implication and necessity. In Chqurnos v. Alkema, 494 
7 
P.2d 950 (Utah 1972), this Court quoted extensively from the 
Utah Supreme Court of Adamson v. Brockbank, 185 P. 2d 264 
(Utah 1947) , which found four requirements were necessary 
for an easement by implication or necessity which are as 
follows: 
1. Unity of title followed by sever-
ance; 
2. The time of severance, servitude 
was apparent, obvious and visible; 
3. Easement was reasonably necessary 
to the enjoyment of the dominant estate; 
and 
4. The use of the easement must be 
continuous as distinguished from one use 
from time-to-time when the occasion 
arises. 
This Court over 40 years ago and as reiterated in 1972, 
requires the above cited factors in order to find an ease-
ment by implication or necessity. Therefore, this Court has 
no need for reliance on the Restatement of Property Law § 
476, which is dated 1944 to consider the factors necessary 
in reviewing a decision as to a finding by a trial Court of 
an easement by implication or necessity, and only the four 
requirements cited need to be met in order to make that 
finding. 
POINT III. 
AN EASEMENT BY IMPLICATION OR NECESSITY 
NEED NOT BE INFERRED FROM WRITTEN 
DOCUMENTS BUT IS AN EXPRESS EXCEPTION TO 
THE WRITING RULE AND FOUND BY NECESSITY 
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The Appellants cite the Court to the Utah Supreme Court 
case of Sears v. Riemersma/ 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982) , as 
evidence that a contract should be resolved against the 
party who had the contract drawn. the Respondent admits 
that her former spouse, Mr. Hill, had the sale documents and 
title insurance prepared and that they contained no refer-
ence to a reservation of an easement. The Sears case did 
not involve an easement or a license or any type of inter-
pretation of the Deed, but dealt specifically with the 
questions concerning the payment provisions of the contract 
and the promissory note such that the cited Sears case is 
actually inapplicable in the immediate|case at hand. 
The Appellants further cite the tourt to the Restate-
ment of Real Property Law regarding doubts and construing a 
conveyance which should be resolved in favor of the 
conveyees. Again, the Appellants are citing this Court to a 
legal treatise written in 1944 which is of no precedential 
value and is even doubtful as to its persuasive value in 
light of the Utah Supreme Court case as cited in Respon-
dent's Memorandum which was filed with the lower Court, 
to-wit: Chournos v. Alkema, 494 P.2d 950 (Utah 1972); and 
Adamson v. Brockbank, 185 P.2d 264 (Utah 1947); and Savage 
v. Nielsen, 197 P.2d 117 (Utah 1948), which found that there 
were four requirements essential for an easement by 
9 
implication or necessity which have been previously cited, 
and further found in Savage v. Nielsen, as follows: 
"The three upon which way of necessity 
is based is that all of the property is 
once owned by a single person. He 
divides it in two tracks and conveys 
away one track. The physical location 
of the other track is such that it is 
not reasonably accessible without 
crossing the track conveyed away. If 
the grantor retains the track which is 
thus surrounded, without any mention of 
a way, it is presumed that he intended 
to reserve a right-of-way to and from 
the track retained. (Emphasis added) If 
he sells the track which is thus sur-
rounded without mention of a means of 
ingress and egress, it is presumed that 
he intended to create a servient estate 
in himself to the extent of a 
right-of-way in favor of the other track 
of land..." 
The Utah Supreme Court case of Savage v. Nielsen, does not 
follow the Restatement of Real Property in every aspect and 
specifically held that if a grantor (conveyor) retains 
property which is surrounded without access, then it is 
presumed [either by implication or necessity] that he 
[grantor/conveyor] intended to reserve a right-of-way to and 
from the property retained. 
For the first time on appeal, the Appellant discusses 
the issues of two Utah statutes, Utah Code Annotated § 
25-5-1 entitled An Estate or Interest in Real Property, and 
Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-11 entitled Claimant Out of 
Possession May Convey. Neither of these statutes convey to 
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the Respondent nor should they convey to this Court the 
Appellants implication that the premises are free from all 
encumbrances if there was no easement reservation. Addi-
tionally, it was well-know case law of this Court that any 
issue raised for the first time on appeal is not to be 
considered. Killian v. Oberhansly, 743 P.2d 1200 (Utah 
1987) The Appellants did not raise the statutes in either 
their Answer nor at time of trial and may not raise them 
now. 
The Appellants further indicate to this Court that 
typical of implied easement cases is that construction or 
interpretation of only one document of conveyance to deter-
mine the intent of the parties, yet the Appellants failed to 
supply any type of Utah case law, Pacific Reporter case law, 
legal treatise or legal periodicals to substantiate their 
claim and therefore Respondent would ask this Court to not 
consider the "typical" statement. 
Again in the next to the last paragraph in Appellants1 
Point I, the Appellants refer to the Restatement § d. Terms 
of Conveyance which again should be considered only as a 
legal treatise having no persuasive or precedential value 
with this Court when considered in light of the three Utah 
Supreme Court cases previously cited. 
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Appellants in the final paragraph of Point I refer this 
Court to an Alaska Supreme Court case of Freightways Term. 
Co. v. Industrial & Com. Const., Inc., 381 P.2d 977 (Alaska 
1963) , by requesting this Court to carefully note that the 
Alaska law does not favor easements by implication because 
they detract from the rules of written instruments. A 
review of that case would indicate that the Supreme Court of 
the State of Alaska held that the evidence sustained the 
finding that the Plaintiff had an easement by oral grant and 
estoppel even though the documents indicated that there was 
no easement, as in the immediate case at hand. 
POINT IV. 
THE LOWER COURT SPECIFICALLY FOUND THAT 
THE EASEMENT WAS REASONABLY NECESSARY TO 
THE ENJOYMENT OF THE DOMINANT ESTATE AND 
FOUND AN EASEMENT BY IMPLICATION OR 
NECESSITY. 
The Appellants correctly cite this Court to the essen-
tial elements of an easement by severance or necessity as 
found in the Utah Supreme Court case of Morris v. Blount, 
161 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1916), as cited by Savage v. Nielsen, 
infra. 
The Appellants would have this Court believe that 
Savage v. Nielsen, Id. at 122 as cited in their brief would 
request this Court to not only involve principals of con-
struction as to determine what the real intent of the 
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parties was at the time of the conveyance, but also to make 
a thoughtful consideration of principals of wise public 
policy, and then further cites the Court to California, New 
Jersey, and Wisconsin Supreme Court law and other allegedly 
persuasive case authority. The Utah Supreme Court has 
considered the elements necessary for the finding of an 
easement by severance, implication or necessity and has 
spelled those requirements out, and has not required a 
careful or thoughtful consideration of principals of wise 
public policy as the Appellants would have this Court 
believe this Court stated in Savage v. Nielsen, Id. at 122. 
Page 122 of Savage spells out the four requirements of an 
easement by severance or necessity and then addresses the 
difference between an easement by necessity and an easement 
by prescription. 
What the Utah test does require is that the easement be 
reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominate estate 
which would imply consideration of other means of access and 
whether or not those would be more reasonable than requiring 
the easement by necessity. The trial Court specifically 
found after consideration of other means of ingress and 
egress as follows: 
21. It is obvious in looking at 
the facility that if Plaintiff [Respon-
dent] was not allowed to use Defendants1 
[Appellants] property for access to the 
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12 west units, there would be no reason-
able access thereto except by foot. 
(Emphasis added) 
22. Although access could be 
obtained to the west units by removing 
the partitions separating the two 
30-foot units, thus making one 60-foot 
unit, such access would be impractical 
and economically infeasible. 
That the use of that portion of 
Defendants1 [Appellants] property 
immediately in front of the storage 
units to a width of 30 feet in front of 
said units running the length of the 
storage facility, is reasonably neces-
sary for the continued operation of the 
storage facility on Plaintiff!s proper-
ty. (R. 29) 
The lower Court Judge did specifically consider the 
reasonable necessity factor as weighed against other ingress 
and egress and found that the easement should be implied or 
an easement established by necessity because the easement 
was reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant 
estate, all of which is consistent with the cited Utah case 
law. 
The question of the consideration paid by the Appel-
lants for the property and the manner in which it was 
required to be paid are both irrelevant and immaterial to 
the issue at hand and were considered by the trial Judge in 
the Motion to Vacate based on Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and were denied. 
Wherefore, the trial Court in finding an easement by 
implication or necessity contrary to Appellants position, 
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did not have to consider public policy in the instant case 
but was required only to consider whether or not the ease-
ment was reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the 
dominant estate, which the Court specifically found after 
considering that alternate routes of ingress and egress 
would be impractical and economically infeasible. This 
meets the Utah requirements and case law of this State, even 
in light of the California, Missouri, New Jersey, Wisconsin 
and New York case law cited by the Appellants. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN DENYING 
THE ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY PERTAINING TO 
THE ECONOMICAL LOSS fO DEFEN-
DANTS/APPELLANTS. 
The Appellants cite this Court to a full page of 
reasons and factors why the trial Court should consider the 
relative burdens of an implied easement and state that 
reciprocity of benefits is impossible of determination if it 
cannot be determined concomitantly exactly what losses will 
be sustained by the property owners, and then cites this 
Court to the Restatement of Property § 476, h, page 2985 
(1944). 
A careful review of comment h, page 2985 and 2986, 
simply indicates that it is preferential that both the 
conveyor and the conveyee receive reciprocal benefits from 
the implication of an easement in favor of each. Again as 
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frequently stated in this brief, the Utah Supreme Court has 
not made as one of its requirements of the four requirements 
for the establishment of an easement by implication that 
there be reciprocal benefits to the conveyor and the 
conveyee, but has required that the easement be reasonably 
necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant estate. On this 
basis alone, Appellants Point III is irrelevant to the 
immediate case at hand. 
Furthermore, 25 Am. Jur. 2d entitled Easements and 
Licenses, defines an easement as follows: 
An easement is always distinct from 
the right to occupy and enjoy the land 
itself. It gives no title to the land 
in which it is imposed, and confers no 
right to participate in the profits 
arising therefrom. 
...An easement has been said to be 
a privilege which the owner of one 
tenement has a right to enjoy over the 
tenement of another...It is a charge or 
burden on one estate, the* servient for 
the benefit of another, the dominant. 
The Respondent in this case is simply seeking to have 
established by the Court her right to use, not possession, 
of a portion of the servient estate as found by necessity or 
implication for her property, the dominant estate. The 
Respondent has in no way acquired possession of the land and 
the Appellants are free in any way to exercise use of the 
land as they desire allowing the Respondent only the right 
of ingress and egress to her property as was allowed by the 
16 
Appellants while they were lessees of the property from 1973 
to 1981, and as allowed by the Appellants as owners of the 
property from 1981 until 1985, and as fs now allowed by the 
judgment of the trial Court after having heard the facts in 
dispute and having properly applied the law and making 
findings with the weight of the evidence. 
POINT VI. 
THE PARTIES BY INTENDED AN EASEMENT 
BY IMPLICATION OR NECESSITY OR AT THE 
VERY LEAST, AN IRREVOCABLE LICENSE 
COUPLED WITH AN INTEREST. 
The Appellants correctly cite this Court to 25 Am. Jur 
2d entitled Easements and Licenses (1966) wherein it states 
as follows: 
An easement always implies an 
interest in the land in and over which 
it is to be enjoyed, whereas a license 
merely confers a personal privilege to 
do some act or acts on the land without 
possessing an estate therein. Further-
more, an easement can be created only by 
grant, or by implication or prescrip-
tion, each of which presupposes a grant, 
whereas a license may be created by 
parole or by an act of the licensor 
sufficient to show his assent. Id., 419 
25 Am. Jur. 2d further states on page 525 as follows: 
A license in real property is 
defined as a personal, revocable, and 
unassignable privilege, conferred either 
by writing or parol, to do one or more 
acts on land without possessing any 
interest therein. 
and further states at pages 530 and 531 as follows: 
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It is generally held that a license 
coupled with a grant or interest is 
irrevocable as long as the interest 
continues. It is said, in this con-
nection, that a license coupled with an 
interest exists where the party obtain-
ing a license to do a thing also ac-
quires a right to do it. In such case, 
the authority conferred is not merely a 
permission; it amounts to a grant, or an 
easement, and where it is so construed 
it amounts to a grant, or an easement, 
and it is so construed it takes, as 
such, the qualities of a right in the 
land itself. ... 
In some jurisdictions, where a 
licensee has entered under a parol 
license and has expended money or its 
equivalent in labor, the license becomes 
irrevocable. The licensee acquires a 
right of entry on the licensor fs land 
for the purpose of mciintaining his 
structures or his rights under his 
license, and the license will continue 
for so long a time as its nature calls 
for. 
Due to a lack of case law in the Utah jurisdiction on 
licenses, both Appellants and Respondent rely on legal 
treatises and persuasive case law of other jurisdictions. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court further explained in Anchor 
Stone and Materials Co. v. Carlin, 436 P.2d 650 (Okl. 1968) 
that where a licensee has incurred expenses in making 
valuable improvements to the property in reliance thereon, 
inuring to the benefit of the licensor-land owner, and which 
will continue to exist and benefit such land owner after 
termination of the license. This would constitute an 
18 
executed license or license by estoppel, which is irrevoca-
ble. 
Even if this Court were to overcome the burden of 
giving great deference to the trial Court's findings and 
rule that the trial Court misapplied the law or found 
against the weight of the evidence, at the very least, the 
Respondent should be granted an irrevocable license coupled 
with an interest. The Appellants have acknowledged giving 
oral consent to the use of their land by the Respondent such 
that a license could exist and this license is reasonably 
necessary for the Respondent to use in order to gain access 
to her property and use such that it should be deemed 
coupled with an interest, therefore making the license an 
irrevocable one. 
The Appellants cite this Court to the Idaho case of 
Howes v. Harmon, 81 P.48 (Ida. 1905), and again raise the 
question of statute of frauds which should not be considered 
as being raised for the first time on appeal. 
Therefore, even if the Court were to find that the 
trial Court had misapplied the law and/or found against the 
weight of the evidence in finding the Respondent is entitled 
to an easement by implication or necessity, there should at 
least be an irrevocable oral license granting the Respondent 
ingress and egress. 
19 
POINT VII. 
IF THE APPELLANTS APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS OR 
FOR DELAY, RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO 
DAMAGES INCLUDING REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S 
FEES, OR IF THE JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED, 
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO COSTS AGAINST 
THE APPELLANT. 
Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure, Rule 33, entitled 
"Damages for Delay or Frivolous Appeal" states as follows: 
(a) If the court shall determine 
that a motion made or appeal taken under 
these rules is either frivolous or for 
delay, it shall award just damages and 
single or double costs, including 
reasonable attorney's fees, to the 
prevailing party. 
Should the court determine that the Appellants appeal is 
either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages 
and single or double costs, including reasonable attorney's 
fees to the Respondent. Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellant Procedure entitled "Award of Costs" states as 
follows: 
(a) To Whom Allowed: Except as 
otherwise provided by lav/, if an appeal 
is dismissed, costs shall be taxed 
against the appellant unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties or by the court; 
if a judgment or an order is affirmed, 
costs shall be taxed against appellant 
unless otherwise ordered;... 
Should appellant's appeal be 
dismissed or respondent's judgment 
affirmed, costs should be taxed against 
the appellant unless otherwise ordered. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court after carefully considering the previous 
Utah Supreme Court cases directly in point in this matter 
which give the four necessary requirements for an easement 
by implication or necessity and affording great deference to 
the trial Court's factual findings should find that the 
trial Court has not misapplied the law and that the findings 
are clearly with the weight of the evidence and uphold or 
affirm the trial Court's decision as the trial Court has 
found specifically that the easement is reasonably necessary 
to the enjoyment of the dominant estate and other means of 
ingress and egress would be impractical and economically 
infeasible, and that even though the written documents do 
not allow for an easement, that is why an easement by 
necessity providing an exception to the writing rule will be 
implied, and further if this Court finds that the Appel-
lants1 appeal was fivolous or for delay, that attorney's 
fees and costs should be awarded to the Respondent, or if 
the trial Court decision is reaffirmed at a minimum costs 
should be awarded to the Respondent 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ? / day of December, 
1987, 
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